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THE IMPACT OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS: 
THE SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSIDIES 
RICHARD L. SCHMALBECK* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In their impressive article, “Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health 
Care,” Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman offer several observations about 
the ways in which American tax law subsidizes nonprofit health care providers, 
particularly hospitals.  They argue that, because qualification for exempt status 
for a nonprofit hospital requires a demonstration that the hospital will cross-
subsidize some services by excess charges imposed on others, only hospitals 
enjoying monopoly profits can qualify.1  One of several consequences is a 
perverse tendency to impose unjustified charges, which fall largely on those 
middle-income employees who have health insurance, in order to provide the 
wherewithal for the subsidies of lower-income patients.2  Another consequence 
is that nonprofit hospitals, being monopolists that are barred from distributing 
profits to shareholders, will tend to accumulate large, and largely unnecessary, 
surpluses.3  Because their charters typically prohibit the use of these surpluses 
for any purpose other than provision of health care, there is a tendency for the 
most successful of these hospitals to become bloated, trapping resources in ways 
that lead to, and reflect, inefficient investments in health care.4 
Some of these things are certainly true, and all of them may be so.  It is 
certainly true that tax rules are a critically important part of the economic 
framework that underlies health economics in the United States.  However, the 
features of greatest importance are not the ones mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph.  Rather, the primary tax rules driving American health care 
economics are the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from the 
gross income of employees5 and the deductibility of extraordinary medical 
expenses by the individuals who bear them.6  These features have been 
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 1. Clark C. Havighurst and Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 
69 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20–22 (Autumn 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 16. 
 4. Id. at 20. 
 5. I.R.C. §§ 105, 106 (2005). 
 6. I.R.C. § 213 (2005).  This provision is accurately described as allowing only extraordinary 
expenses as deductions because it imposes a nondeductible floor on deductions equal to 7.5% of the 
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described and analyzed in Lawrence Zelenak’s insightful article in this issue.7  
They constitute something of a demand-side subsidy, enabling consumers to 
purchase more health care than they often would purchase, or would want to 
purchase, otherwise. 
Havighurst and Richman appear to agree on the primacy of the health-
insurance and expense-deduction rules, but they go beyond that to argue that 
some of what might be called the supply-side tax features, which provide 
subsidies to certain qualifying nonprofit providers of health care, are also 
important.8  However, these tax rules may well have less significance than 
Havighurst and Richman seem to accord them.  In particular, while some 
element of cross-subsidy remains a benchmark for exemption, the requirement 
has become so attenuated over time that its economic importance would now 
appear to be minimal.  And, although nonprofit hospitals may indeed have 
become vessels of inefficient creation and storage of huge surpluses, this effect 
is difficult to prove and in any case may be ambiguous in its effects on the 
economics of American health care. 
This article first provides some background and history of the tax rules 
governing nonprofit health care institutions, then assesses the significance of the 
subsidies these tax rules create.  Such significance is, in short, negligible:  the 
subsidies do not bring any very impressive forces to bear on the market for 
health care. 
II 
BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE  
EXEMPTION OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 
A. The Section 501(c)(3) Exemption 
 The centerpiece of the supply-side subsidies in the American health care 
system is the exemption, under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3),9 
from the corporate income tax enjoyed directly by the institutions in question.  
Some additional ancillary benefits flow indirectly from the tax exemption, 
including the deductibility of contributions made to those organizations by 
donors,10 which undoubtedly benefits the exempt institutions by stimulating 
such contributions; the ability to issue bonds whose interest payments are 
 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.  Id.  As a consequence, fewer than nine million taxpayers were able 
to claim a medical expense deduction in 2003—a number that is just 19.7% of all taxpayers who itemize 
their deductions and less than 6.7% of all taxpayers in the aggregate.  Richard L. Schmalbeck, 
unpublished calculation (on file with author) (based on Michael Parisi and Scott Hollenbeck, Individual 
Income Tax Returns, 2003, 25 STAT. OF INCOME BULL., No. 2, at 9, 25, 42 (Fall 2005)). 
 7. Lawrence Zelenak, Of Head Taxes, Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health 
Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Autumn 2006).  
 8. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
 9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005). 
 10. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2005). 
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exempt from the federal income tax,11 a feature that lowers the cost of capital 
available to institutions permitted to issue such bonds; and exemption from 
certain state and local taxes.12  These features are generally of lesser and more 
ambiguous effects than their demand-side counterparts, but may still influence 
the shape of health care in this country in important ways. 
The availability in the health care industry of the subsidy provided by these 
supply-side tax features is at first puzzling.  When one reads the list of 
categories of organizations entitled to these benefits, it is not immediately 
evident that there is a category into which a modern nonprofit hospital easily 
falls.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) allows exemption for corporations and similar 
organizations that are “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, 
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . .”13  Some hospitals do, of 
course, perform research, and those same hospitals often provide medical 
education to students, as well as to recently credentialed doctors and nurses.  
And some hospitals are operated by religious orders.  However, it would only 
rarely be true that educational, scientific, or religious activities would be the 
primary focus of a medical center.  The primary focus is instead upon the 
treatment of injuries and diseases.  How does this focus fit in the matrix of 
exemption-eligible categories listed above? 
It really does not fit; but nonprofit hospitals are nevertheless regarded as 
eligible for exempt status on the grounds that they are within the more general 
“charitable” category of § 501(c)(3).  That view, however, is more than a little 
anachronistic as applied to a medical center in the twenty-first century.  
Although the “charitable” category is something of a catch-all—a residual 
description of organizations that seem somehow deserving of this status—its 
primary usage is intended to connote organizations whose mission is “relief of 
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged.”14  It was substantially 
accurate to view hospitals in that way a century ago, when the range of medical 
treatments available was much more limited than it is today and hospitals were 
frequently little more than dormitories for those who were too ill or infirm to 
provide for their own sustenance and who had no wealth or family resources on 
which to draw for support. 
Today’s hospital is quite a different enterprise, and a dormitory is one of the 
things it least resembles.  The modern hospital houses patients only reluctantly, 
and then only those in need of the most acute care.  Rather than house patients 
 
 11. I.R.C. §§ 103(a), 141(e)(1)(G), 145(a) (2005).  See infra note 57 for further detail on exempt 
bond financing. 
 12. See text and infra notes 58, 59. 
 13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  This language permits exemption from tax for the organization.  Similar 
language allowing donors to deduct their contributions is found at I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), except that the 
latter provision does not allow deductions for public-safety testing organizations. 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (1990). 
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(or the “sick–poor,” as the hospital population was formerly called15), today’s 
hospitals primarily house expensive diagnostic and treatment equipment and a 
highly skilled labor force, which together  provide very specialized services to 
patients across a broad range of economic circumstances.  Although practices 
vary widely, the bias in selection of patients is generally not in the direction of 
serving the poor, but precisely the opposite:  the doors are always open to the 
wealthy and the well-insured, but more grudgingly, if at all, to others. 
Nevertheless, the availability of exempt status persists.  Those who make 
and interpret the tax laws have not been completely oblivious to the gradually 
changing nature of hospitals, but have apparently preferred a series of awkward 
accommodations of reality to the more difficult task of fundamental tax reform.  
A brief sketch of those awkward accommodations will help inform our sense of 
how far the law has strayed from a coherent policy view of the supply-side 
subsidy embodied in the exemption and charitable contribution rules relating to 
hospitals. 
B. Treasury Guidance on Exemption Standards 
Although the exemption and its accompanying charitable deduction have 
been a part of the tax landscape from the beginning,16 very little official 
guidance from the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) appeared 
before the mid-1950s.  A landmark ruling, Revenue Ruling 56-185, was issued in 
1956, providing a list of “requirements” for exemption of a nonprofit hospital.17  
In addition to conditions of little relevance here, the ruling explained that such 
a hospital “must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not 
able to pay for the services rendered . . . .”18  The clear implication of the 
paragraph was that an exempt hospital was expected to engage in more or less 
explicit cross-subsidization among patient groups, with those who could afford 
treatment paying for the total costs of operating the hospital, including costs 
attributable to care for those who could not afford to pay the full costs, if they 
could indeed afford to pay anything at all.  A willingness to treat the poor either 
at diminished rates or without charge was clearly a paramount consideration: 
“It [an exempt hospital] must not, however, refuse to accept patients in need of 
hospital care who cannot pay for such services.”19 
 
 15. See Daloia v. Franciscan Health Sys., 679 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ohio 1997); David Villar Patton, 
The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on 
Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 162 (2000) (referring to the hospital 
population as the “sick–poor”). 
 16. 38 Stat. 168 (1913). 
 17. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203–04. 
 18. Id.  The requirements of little interest here related to having organizational documents 
specifying charitable purpose, banning private inurement, and so on.  The key point for this discussion 
is the specific attention devoted to alleviation of the effects of poverty. 
 19. Id. 
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This view was also reflected in a more or less contemporaneous expression 
of policy embodied in regulations proposed later the same year.20  These 
regulations reflected a relatively narrow view of the “charitable” category, 
confined exclusively to relief of the effects of poverty.21  This position does not 
appear to have been offered as a departure from prior law, but rather as a 
codification of existing practice.22  These regulations were never finalized, but 
neither were they supplanted by any contradictory guidance over the next 
thirteen years. 
In 1969, however, another ruling and regulation did signal an abrupt change 
in policy.  In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS considered two hypothetical 
hospitals that were seeking exemptions.23  As in many revenue rulings, the two 
cases were presented as polar pairs, on opposite sides of the line dividing the 
good from the bad.24  The surprise was in the liberality with which the IRS 
viewed the hypothetical good case.  The good case was a community hospital 
that had an “open staff”—meaning simply that its facilities were open to any 
doctor in the community.  It was governed by a board whose membership 
consisted of “prominent citizens in the community.”25  The hospital operated an 
emergency room that had a policy requiring the care of all who needed 
emergency services, but the general patient policy of the hospital was to “limit[] 
admissions to those who can pay the cost of their hospitalization [by means of 
government assistance, private insurance, or personal resources.]”26  Even 
though any cross-subsidy would be quite limited—being confined only to the 
emergency room services—the IRS concluded that a hospital of this sort was 
entitled to exemption from tax.27 
This ruling was quite controversial at the time.  Indeed, it was challenged in 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon28 by a public-interest 
law firm, primarily on the grounds that by so narrowing the range of the 
provision of services to indigents, the ruling constituted an impermissible 
departure from the language of the Internal Revenue Code.29  In effect, the 
argument was that such a hospital could not be considered “charitable” as 
 
 20. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 460, 464 (Jan. 21, 1956). 
 21. Id. 
 22. The ruling in particular contains references to earlier, less general IRS announcements, such as 
a 1941 General Counsel’s Memorandum that suggests that the positions in the 1956 ruling, later 
reflected in the proposed regulations, were consistent with a continuous ruling position of the 
government.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,554 (June 21, 1941). 
 23. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 24. And, again as is often the case, the distance between the polar hypothetical hospitals in this 
ruling is so wide that only limited guidance is provided on the precise location of the line separating 
qualified hospitals from those that are not. 
 25. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. at 117.  The hypothetical hospital found not to qualify for exempt 
status was controlled by the doctors who founded it, was not open to more than a few other doctors, 
and had a “relatively inactive” emergency room.  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 118. 
 28. (Simon II), 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
 29. Id. at 26. 
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required by the statute and was therefore ineligible for exemption under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3).  This argument succeeded at the district court level30 but was 
reversed on substantive grounds by the court of appeals.31  Ultimately, an appeal 
to the Supreme Court resulted in denial of the claim (vacating the order of the 
court of appeals) on grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
ruling.32 
In the same year that it issued Revenue Ruling 69-545, the Treasury/IRS 
promulgated new regulations under § 501(c)(3) that expanded the range of 
“charitable” far beyond the relief-of-poverty rationale that had prevailed until 
that time.33   Together with Revenue Ruling 69-545, these regulations introduced 
what came to be known as the “community benefit” standard and recognized 
“promotion of health” for the first time as a legitimate basis for tax exemption, 
regardless of the financial need of the patient population served.34  Although 
hospitals seem to enjoy an especially favorable status under this standard,35 it is 
also the case that other categories of nonprofit organizations enjoyed a more 
relaxed set of exemption qualifications under these regulations.  For example, 
organizations designed to “lessen neighborhood tensions,” “defend human and 
civil rights secured by law,” and “combat community deterioration and juvenile 
delinquency” also found explicit endorsement of their purposes as ones that 
could qualify them for exemption under § 501(c)(3).36 
In light of the fact that the open emergency room seemed to be the last 
remaining link to the relief-of-poverty rationale, it is somewhat surprising that 
subsequent rulings eroded even that.  In Revenue Ruling 83-157, the IRS ruled 
that in the case of specialized hospitals, such as cancer or eye hospitals, in which 
emergency rooms are clearly needed less and hence are usually not part of such 
hospitals’ facilities, even the open-emergency-room requirement was waived.37  
Thus, in the span of less than fifteen years, the standard for exemption went 
from one that depended heavily on the general availability of care to the poor 
 
 30. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F.Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 31. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon (Simon I), 506 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 32. Simon II, 426 U.S. at 26–27. 
 33. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1990). 
 34. Neither phrase appears in the regulations themselves, but the ruling reads, in relevant part: 
The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the advancement of education and 
religion, is one of the purposes in the general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the 
community as a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct benefit 
from its activities does not include all members of the community, such as indigent members 
of the community, provided that the class is not so small that its relief is not of benefit to the 
community. 
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118.  There is no elaboration on the minimum size of the group that 
must be benefited in order to qualify as a “community benefit.” 
 35. See discussion infra note 38 of the subsequent rulings that seem to confer special status on 
hospitals. 
 36. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2). 
 37. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 94–95. 
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to one in which only emergency care needed to be provided to the poor, and 
not even that if special circumstances made that impractical.38 
C. Uneven Application of Treasury Principles 
Despite the much-liberalized policy on tax exemption of hospitals and the 
apparent breadth of the “promotion of health” concept, not all nonprofit 
organizations that might seem to qualify under this standard have actually 
managed to achieve tax exemption.  For example, in Federation Pharmacy 
Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,39 a nonprofit firm sold drugs to elderly and 
handicapped customers at prices intended to cover only the firm’s costs.40  The 
tax court was unimpressed that the drugs were sold at a discount from normal 
retail prices, observing that commercial enterprises frequently did the same.41  
In sum, the tax court simply thought that this entity was, in fact, engaged in a 
commercial activity, even though it was structured in a way that provided 
health-related products at below-market prices to a population—the elderly and 
handicapped—that could reasonably have been presumed to be 
disproportionately poor.  Judge Sterrett’s summary says it all: 
It is clear that [Federation’s] exclusive purpose . . . is to sell drugs, an activity that is 
normally carried on by a commercial profitmaking enterprise[] . . . .  We fail to see 
how the fact that it happens to deal in drugs [converts] it to a section 501(c)(3) 
organization.  If it could be so converted, then so could a store selling orthopedic 
shoes, crutches, health foods, or any other product beneficial to health.42 
Precisely the problem with this interpretation is that once the IRS had 
expressed its sense that hospitals could qualify for exemption largely on 
grounds that they served to promote health, one might have thought that 
vending drugs, orthopedic shoes, crutches, et cetera, if operated on a nonprofit 
basis, would qualify as well.  But apparently that is not so, at least in the view of 
the tax court. 
The story is much the same in the case of health-maintenance organizations 
(HMOs).  The very name of this category of entities suggests that promotion of 
health is what they are about, and at least some of them also have elements of 
cross-subsidization that should put them in harmony with the traditional ideas 
of charity.  But they have not generally fared well in their efforts to achieve tax 
 
 38. To be sure, even after 1969 qualification for exemption was not available to any sort of 
nonprofit hospital.  In addition to the normal exempt-status requirements banning private inurement 
and the like, Revenue Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 both make it clear that factors relating to the 
openness of the hospital to all physicians in the community, broad community representation on the 
board of directors, and the use of any surpluses for research or capital improvements were matters to 
be considered in evaluating the case for exemption.  See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, and Rev. 
Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. 
 39. 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff’d, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 40. See Fed’n Pharmacy Servs., Inc., 72 T.C. at 689–90 (stating that the elderly and handicapped 
were entitled to become “members” of the organization, which entitled them to automatic five percent 
discounts, while nonmembers were allowed to purchase drugs, but only at prices that were intended to 
replicate the full retail price for such drugs charged by commercial enterprises). 
 41. Id. at 692. 
 42. Id. at 691–92. 
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exemption.43  The IRS position with respect to HMOs has been consistently 
hostile, and in the few cases that have been tried, that position has ordinarily 
been sustained by the courts.44  The prominent exception, Sound Health Ass’n. 
v. Commissioner,45 involved an HMO that directly operated health care 
facilities, and thus to some degree resembled a hospital. 
HMOs that merely arrange for the provision of care or for covering its cost, 
rather than providing care directly, have not achieved similar success under the 
“community benefit” standard.  The most recent major decision in this area, 
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner,46 is useful for its summary of the 
community-benefit standard.  That standard, as viewed by the Tenth Circuit 
panel, requires a health care institution to make its services available to a broad 
range of the population within its community, but also requires “some 
additional ‘plus.’”47  The amorphous “plus” factor can vary, but the Tenth 
Circuit suggested that devoting surpluses to research or teaching, or providing 
free or below-cost services, would normally qualify.48  One might argue that 
precisely because any need to provide shareholders with a return on equity 
investments is absent, a well-managed nonprofit HMO would be able to cover 
the cost of medical care at prices that would be at least modestly below market 
prices established by commercial insurance companies.  Indeed, the tax court 
below in this very case found that the HMO’s policies and practices “likely 
allowed its enrollees to obtain medical care at a lower cost than might otherwise 
have been available.”49  But providing care at below-market cost was not, 
apparently, the sort of “plus” factor that the court of appeals was looking for, 
and exempt status was denied.50  A similar outcome, with a slightly different 
explanation, was reached in the one other case involving an HMO that did not 
engage directly in the provision of health care.51 
 
 43. The IRS did announce, in 2003, its intention to review its position on the possible exempt status 
of HMOs, and to provide further guidance.  IRS Notice 2003-31, 2003-1 C.B. 948.  To date, however, no 
further guidance has been issued. 
 44. See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1201–03 (10th Cir. 2003) (denying HMOs 
tax exemption because they did not operate for purpose of promoting health for benefit of community, 
and because the HMOs were found not to be an integral part of affiliated tax-exempt hospital division); 
see also Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that HMOs that 
provided no significant benefits to anyone other than their paying subscribers did not qualify for tax-
exempt status). 
 45. 71 T.C. 158 (1978), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 1, action on dec., 1981-127 (June 10, 1981). 
 46. 325 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. IHC Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606, 615 (2001). 
 50. IHC Health Plans, Inc., 325 F.3d at 1204. 
 51. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the HMO, 
despite having a subsidized dues plan for low-income members, was not entitled to exemption).  A later 
case involving the same plan, Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r (Geisinger II), decided upon remand 
that the HMO could not qualify for exemption on the basis of its relationship with other entities that 
were exempt.  30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994).  See also I.R.S. Technical Advice Memorandum 98-37129, in 
which the IRS considered the status of an HMO and found it not qualified for exemption on similar 
grounds. 
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Thus the current state of the law in this area can only be characterized as 
incoherent.  Beginning from a historical position in which subsidized health care 
was the touchstone for exemption, we have moved to a position in which 
subsidized health care was neither necessary (as in the case of the cancer 
hospital) nor sufficient (as in the cases of HMOs and the nonprofit drug store).  
None of this movement was based on statutory change, though of course the 
promulgation of regulations consistent with the Internal Revenue Code and the 
decisions of our courts carry the full force of law.  But that law makes little 
sense from a policy perspective.  It is law that provides tax subsidies to 
organizations that institutionalize some degree of cross-subsidization of care 
and favors organizations that promote health, but not in a consistent manner. 
Further, to the degree that some shred of the cross-subsidy flavor remains in 
the law, it is worth asking whether even that still makes sense in a health care 
system in which federal and state governments have largely assumed the burden 
of financing the cost of medical care for the poorest segment of our population 
(through Medicaid52) and the segment of our population that generally requires 
the greatest amount of medical care, the elderly (through Medicare53).  Under 
such circumstances, cross-subsidies may involve, for example, situations in 
which the modestly compensated hourly employees of large employers are 
subsidizing the health care costs of better-compensated independent 
contractors who may not carry health insurance, such as real-estate sales 
workers, smaller construction contractors, or even lawyers in private practice.54  
Whether this sort of upside-down cross-subsidy is the norm or not, it is clearly 
among the possibilities under current rules and interpretations, casting serious 
doubt on the validity of the arguments for exempt status of those health care 
institutions that succeed in achieving that status. 
III 
THE IMPACT OF THE SUBSIDIES 
But does any of this matter?  To put it another way, are the tax subsidies 
available to certain health care institutions significant enough to make much of 
a difference?  A shorthand answer, to be detailed a bit more below, is that the 
subsidies are not trivial and could make a difference at the margin in some 
cases.  But the subsidies are probably not of a magnitude that would make them 
a dominant force in the economics of health care in the United States. 
A. How Do the Subsidies Work? 
A brief description of the tax features that provide subsidies to those 
institutions that achieve exemption will be helpful in assessing the importance 
 
 52. Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (2000). 
 53. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 54. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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of these features.  Considered here will be the effects of (1) the exemption from 
federal income taxes of qualifying nonprofit health care institutions;55 (2) the 
opportunity for donors to such institutions to deduct their donations from their 
income for federal income-tax purposes;56 and (3) the opportunity of exempt 
health care institutions to issue bonds whose interest payments are excluded 
from federal income taxes.57  These features are ordinarily replicated in various 
state statutes providing similar exemptions, deductions, and exclusions from 
state income taxes, but not uniformly so.58  A number of other ancillary features 
associated with exempt status are likely to be of benefit to exempt health care 
institutions, such as exemption from state and local sales and property taxes,59 
favorable postal rates, etc.60  Although these are no doubt of considerable value 
to the institutions that qualify, they are too diffuse to be considered 
comprehensively in a paper of this scope.  Instead, only the supply-side federal 
income-tax elements of the nonprofit medical-services industry will be 
examined here. 
B. The Exemption 
The first element of subsidy is of course the exemption itself, under I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3).  This provision exempts the qualifying institution from whatever 
income tax that would otherwise apply, which in almost all cases is the 
corporate income tax under I.R.C. § 11.61  It seems as though this would be a 
benefit of great significance, and in some cases it may be.  But it is useful to 
remember that precisely because the institutions in question are organized as 
nonprofit corporations, they are under no pressure to produce any net income 
for shareholders that would be subject to tax.  And many probably do not.  The 
latest statistics available indicate that health organizations filing information 
 
 55. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005). 
 56. I.R.C. § 170 (2005). 
 57. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2005) exempts interest paid on certain bonds from inclusion in the gross 
income of the recipient, as long as the bonds are “qualified bonds.”  I.R.C. § 141(e)(1)(G) (2005) makes 
it clear that “qualified 501(c)(3) bonds” are within this exemption.  A qualified 501(c)(3) bond is 
defined in I.R.C. § 145(a) (2005) to include any bond issued by an organization exempted under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3), subject to a few conditions that are not salient here. 
 58. An encyclopedic summary of state laws on these questions is beyond the scope of this article, 
but the following examples from the laws of North Carolina will serve as illustrations: North Carolina 
allows nonprofit charitable organizations an exemption from the state corporate income tax. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 105-130.11(a) (West 1998).  And, by incorporating the federal definition of income into 
the North Carolina personal income tax, it effectively allows deductions from state income taxes for 
charitable contributions to the extent those contributions are deductible for federal income tax 
purposes. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-134.5(a) (2005). 
 59. Again using North Carolina as an illustration, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.14(b) (1995) 
allows exempt organizations to obtain refunds of sales taxes paid.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-275(7) 
(2003) exempts real and personal property of such organizations from the reach of taxes otherwise 
applicable to holdings of those properties. 
 60. The favorable postal rates for exempt organizations are described at 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 3626.  See 
also I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8) (2005), which exempts charitable organizations from federal employment taxes. 
 61. Very infrequently, a hospital or other organization might be organized as a charitable trust, in 
which case I.R.C. § 1(e) (2005) would be the operative tax provision from which the organization was 
exempt.   
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returns with the IRS for the 2002 tax year reported total revenue of about $550 
billion, and total expenses of $541 billion.62  Although this yields a (nontrivial) 
net-income figure of $9 billion, the total revenue figure included some $41 
billion of contributions, grants, and gifts, most of which would not be 
considered as part of gross income under the usual income tax rules.63  Thus, 
allowing for the exclusion of most of the latter figure would put health 
organizations into a net-loss position in the aggregate.  Further, exempt 
organizations have no reason, so long as they are indeed exempt, to undertake 
even the slightest efforts at tax minimization.  For example, although the annual 
tax return filed by charities allows them to take deductions for depreciation of 
their buildings and equipment, a charity would have no reason to seek the 
maximum deductions possible in circumstances that would permit a range of 
options as to depreciation methods to business taxpayers.  Similarly, because 
there is no tax amount against which credits could be claimed, there is not even 
a line item for such credits on the charitable organizations’ return.64  Thus, one 
imagines that if hospitals were suddenly to lose their exempt status, they would 
be able to arrange their affairs in such a way that they would have an even 
greater deficit, in the aggregate. 
Of course, aggregate negative numbers would not be inconsistent with the 
possibility that some hospitals, in some years, would achieve significant profits.  
But another feature of the income tax as applied to businesses may then come 
into play: the opportunity to net profits and losses across years, using net 
operating-loss deductions accumulated in loss years to offset income in up to 
two preceding and twenty following years.65  Thus, even among hospitals 
sometimes showing a profit, only those that consistently do so over time would 
be exposed to any ultimate tax liabilities. 
There is no question that such hospitals are rare, and there is further no 
doubt that those lucky few are grateful for their exemption from income tax.  
The aggregate numbers, however, together with one’s conjectures about what 
the aggregate numbers would look like if nonprofit hospitals had an incentive to 
undertake even a modest amount of tax planning, suggest that not much 
revenue is lost due to the exemption.  Since the subsidy inheres in the lost 
 
 62. Internal Revenue Serv., Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2002, 25 STAT. 
INCOME BULL. 263, 264 (Fall 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02eochar.pdf.  
Organizations other than churches must, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6033(a), file an annual return (IRS Form 
990), on which this report is based, unless their income is generally less than $25,000.  See DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY I.R.S., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2005), 
available at http://www.irs.gov.pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.  It is thus safe to assume that these data include all 
nonprofit hospitals. 
 63. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 62, at 264.  I.R.C. § 102 allows a broad exclusion for 
amounts received as gifts.  It is possible that some grants, however, might not qualify for this exclusion, 
so some part of the $41 billion in this category could imaginably be included in income for tax purposes 
if the organization receiving it were not exempt. 
 64. Among the credits for which hospitals might be able to qualify would be the research credit 
under 26 U.S.C.A. § 41(a), the employer-provided-childcare credit under 26 U.S.C.A. § 45F(a), the 
work-opportunity credit under I.R.C. § 51(a), and a number of others. 
 65. I.R.C. § 172 (2005). 
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revenue, we can safely conclude that federal tax subsidies directly due to tax-
exempt status are not likely to be a significant force affecting the market for 
health services.  Notably, the federal government makes no estimate of the “tax 
expenditure”—roughly, the revenue foregone because of favorable tax features 
that deviate from an ideal income tax—associated with exempt status for health 
care institutions.66  This is probably because exemption could itself be 
considered among the baseline features of the tax system, so there is no 
deviation from the norm involved.67 
C. Charitable Contributions Deductions 
In contrast, the deduction available for charitable gifts to qualifying 
nonprofit health care institutions constitutes a clear, and measurable, subsidy.  
This tax feature is technically independent of the institution’s status under 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because the charitable contributions deduction has its own set 
of rules, and its own criteria for deductibility, under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).  
However, the language of the latter section is virtually identical to section 
501(c)(3), for all purposes relevant here.68 
The ordinary workings of the charitable contribution deduction are 
straightforward:  if a donor gives a dollar to a charitable organization, such as a 
qualifying nonprofit hospital, that amount can be deducted from gross income, 
yielding a savings equal to that one dollar times the taxpayer’s marginal tax 
rate.  At the moment, marginal tax rates run up to thirty-five percent, so a 
contributed dollar may result in a tax savings to the donor of up to thirty-five 
cents.  This could be characterized as a matching-grant program, under which 
the government pays up to thirty-five cents for every sixty-five cents 
contributed by the private donor.69  Corporate donors face much the same 
deduction arithmetic, since medium and large corporations are taxed at 
marginal rates of either thirty-four percent or thirty-five percent.70  Of course, 
some donors are in lower tax brackets and receive correspondingly lesser 
benefits.71  And, because the charitable contributions deduction is an itemized 
 
 66. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006 , at 316 (2006), available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/ 
7/255/2422/07feb20051415/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/spec.pdf. 
 67. For a full development of this view, see Boris I. Bittker and George K. Rahdert, The 
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).  
Reduced to its essentials, this article demonstrates that the federal-income-tax principles and rules were 
simply not designed to tax any excess of receipts over disbursements in any annual period that might be 
achieved by an exempt organization. 
 68. See discussion supra note 13. 
 69. Sixty-five cents is the appropriate denominator, rather than one dollar, because the net burden 
to the donor of making a gross gift of one dollar is that one dollar less the thirty-five cents of tax 
savings. 
 70. I.R.C. § 11 (2005). 
 71. Currently, tax rates range from as low as ten percent up to the thirty-five percent maximum 
rate. 
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deduction, those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions receive no tax 
benefits from their contributions at all.72 
In some cases, the benefits of contributions can be even greater because 
donors can ordinarily deduct the fair market value of appreciated property that 
they contribute to charities.  Suppose, for example, that an entrepreneur has 
$1000 of founder’s stock with a negligible basis that he is considering selling or 
contributing.  If he sells, he will face a capital gains tax of, typically, fifteen 
percent, leaving $850 after that tax.  If he contributes the stock, he will not be 
taxed on the capital gain, and he will be able to shelter $1000 of unrelated 
income with a deduction for the contribution of $1000 of property, generating 
as much as $350 of tax savings.  Thus, the net cost of making the gift under these 
assumptions may be as little as $500 for a $1000 gift, which resembles a 100% 
matching grant program.73 
Although this treatment is quite favorable, its impact on the health care 
industry is limited by the fact that health care institutions do not seem to be 
among the favorite targets of donors.  Because taxpayers are not required to 
disclose the names of their charitable donees, no official information on the 
amount of contributions can be compiled.  A recent and widely respected 
estimate, however, is that charitable gifts to the health subsector were just 
under $22 billion in 2004.74  This is roughly consistent with the Office of 
Management and Budget’s estimate of the amount of federal revenue foregone 
due to charitable contributions to health organizations, which is that such gifts 
were associated with a revenue loss of a bit over $3 billion in fiscal year 2004, 
and with about $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2006.75 
The impact of the contribution deduction on the economics of health care is 
thus not large in the aggregate, and it is even further diminished by the fact that 
 
 72. In 2003, 33.7% of all individual taxpayers itemized their returns.  Author calculations based on 
tables 1 and 3, Michael Parisi and Scott Hollenbeck, supra note 6.  “However, the decision to itemize is 
closely linked to income, with 85.2% of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes exceeding $75,000 being 
itemizers.”  Id.  Hence, while a minority of taxpayers itemize, it is reasonable to infer that a majority of 
contributed dollars are deducted by itemizers who obtain some tax benefits from making their 
contributions. 
 73. To make the arithmetic a bit more explicit, assume taxpayer has a $1000 gain and $1000 of 
unrelated income.  The total tax will be as much as $150 on the gain and $350 on the unrelated income, 
leaving $1500 after tax.  If she gives away the $1000 asset instead of selling it, both taxes are avoided, 
leaving the $1000 of unrelated income intact.  This outcome, $1000 of after-tax income, is only $500 
worse than the result that would have obtained had no gift been made at all. 
 74. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIV., GIVING USA 2005: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON 
PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2004, at 123 (2005). 
 75. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 318.  The precise estimates were $3090 
million in FY 2004 and $3670 million in FY 2006.  Id.  Each federal fiscal year begins in October of the 
preceding numbered year and runs through September of the numbered year.  For example, FY 2006 
runs from October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006.  The revenue loss is “roughly consistent” with a 
much larger gross-giving estimate, because the tax loss is no more than the marginal rate of tax times 
the amount of the gift.  See RICHARD SCHMALBECK AND LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION, at 356 (2004).  Also, some gifts are made by individuals who do not itemize their 
deductions, by individuals whose contributions are nondeductible because they exceed the limitations 
of I.R.C. § 170(b) on individual deductions (which generally limit deductions to no more than fifty 
percent of the donor’s adjusted gross income), or by other tax-exempt institutions.  Id. 
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much of what is given is specifically designated for medical research or 
international programs, not for the direct provision of medical care to 
Americans.76 
D. Tax-exempt Financing 
The final member of the trio of favorable supply-side tax features is the 
opportunity provided to qualifying nonprofit health care institutions to borrow 
money for capital projects by issuing bonds whose interest payments are exempt 
from federal income tax.  I.R.C. § 103(a) permits the exclusion of interest paid 
with respect to state and local government bonds, and § 103(b), in effect, 
extends that favorable treatment to any of several types of “qualified bonds,” 
among which are “501(c)(3) bonds,” which are described in I.R.C. § 145.  
Unsurprisingly, “501(c)(3) bonds” are those that finance property owned by 
organizations described in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3),77 so qualification to issue 
such bonds is essentially automatic upon grant of the basic tax exemption.  
Although there is a state-by-state volume cap on the issuance of all “private 
activity bonds,”78 (of which section 501(c)(3) bonds are a subcategory), the 
501(c)(3) bonds are exempt from that cap.79  Until 1997, there were limits on 
bond financing imposed on each institution.80  But even under those limits, 
hospitals were treated favorably, being exempt from the institutional limits as 
long as ninety-five percent of any particular bond issue was devoted to hospital 
construction.81 
Exemption of the interest on 501(c)(3) bonds from income taxation of 
course allows issuers of such bonds to market them at rates of return that are 
somewhat lower than issuers of otherwise comparable bonds would need to 
pay, thus lowering the capital costs of the institutions endowed with this 
privilege.  The Office and Management and Budget estimates that the federal 
subsidy, in terms of foregone revenue due to the interest exemption feature, 
will amount to about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2006.82 
 
 76. For example, by far the largest gifts to the health subsector in recent years have been those 
made by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which have focused on research and treatment efforts 
targeted at AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis epidemics, largely in third-world regions.  See CTR. ON 
PHILANTHROPY AT INDIANA UNIV. supra note 74, at 126–27. 
 77. See I.R.C. § 145(a)(1) (“[A]ll property which is to be provided by the net proceeds of the issue 
is to be owned by a 501(c)(3) organization or a governmental unit . . . .”). 
 78. I.R.C. § 146(a). 
 79. I.R.C. § 146(g)(2). 
 80. The limit was a fairly generous $150 million of bonded indebtedness outstanding at any one 
time per institution.  See I.R.C. § 145(b) (2000).  This provision is still in the Code, but is subject to a 
built-in expiration of effectiveness by the terms of I.R.C. § 145(b)(5), which was added in 1997.  
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997). 
 81. I.R.C. § 145(b)(1). 
 82. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 318 (stating the precise estimate at $2160 
million). 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the three supply-side subsidies provided through the federal tax rules 
do not, even cumulatively, bring any very impressive forces to bear on the 
market for health care.  Exemption from taxation surely saves some institutions 
some tax they would otherwise pay, but most institutions would likely be able, 
by careful tax planning or, more commonly, by having genuinely unprofitable 
operations, to avoid all or most of the tax.  Indirect subsidies provided to health 
care institutions by the deductibility of contributions to them, and the exclusion 
of interest paid by them, are not trivial, but add up to less than seven billion 
dollars per year—hardly of much significance in an industry whose contribution 
to the gross domestic product now exceeds two trillion dollars per year.83 
One way of putting the supply-side subsidies in perspective is presented by 
the Office of Management and Budget’s list of the top tax expenditures, which 
ranks the various departures from an ideal income tax in terms of their 
budgetary effects over the next five fiscal years.84  At the very top of the list, 
hundreds of billions of dollars ahead of the next-most-expensive item, is the 
exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance and medical care, 
amounting to over $760 billion.85  This, of course, is the centerpiece of the 
demand-side subsidy discussed elsewhere in this volume.86  In contrast, the 
charitable-contribution deduction ranks twenty-ninth at a total cost of about $21 
billion over the same period;87 and the exclusion of interest on hospital 
construction bonds ranks thirty-ninth, at a total cost of less than $12 billion over 
this period.88 
It seems likely, however, that despite the relatively modest dollar value of 
the federal subsidies on the supply side, the presence of substantial numbers of 
nonprofit institutions affects the market for medical services in a variety of 
ways.  For example, it seems possible that in an oligopolistic market, the 
presence of a significant number of providers whose pricing structures may 
include explicit efforts to cross-subsidize one group of users through above-
market charges imposed on other users might create something of a pricing 
“umbrella” that could be mimicked by the profit-seeking entities in the same 
market.  The mimicking, however, would likely not involve similar cross-
subsidies; that is, the profit-seeking entities might employ the “subsidizing” 
price schedule where the market would bear that structure, without using the 
surplus created thereby to subsidize anyone but their own shareholders.  
Similarly, it is possible that inefficiencies that some suspect afflict nonprofit 
 
 83. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 12. 
 84. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 324–26. 
 85. Id. at 324. 
 86. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36–39; Zelenak, supra note 7, at 109–20. 
 87. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 66, at 324. 
 88. Id. 
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entities in particular could provide a similar pricing umbrella for the profit-
seeking competitors in the same region. 
It is also possible that nonprofit hospitals have become repositories of stores 
of assets that are in excess of any reasonable capital needs of the health care 
industry.  This could be the result of enjoying monopoly profits, and, in effect, 
having nothing else to do with them (because of the ban on distributions of 
profits) than to invest them internally.89  This is, however, very difficult to 
demonstrate with available accounting data.  As noted earlier,90 the annual 
reports filed by nonprofit hospitals with the IRS show little if any aggregate 
surplus. 
To be sure, “shadow surpluses” could be hidden in either or both of two 
ways:  the potential availability of surpluses could simply lessen pressures on 
expenses, so that expenses effectively rise to meet the revenues; alternatively or 
in addition, some of the “expense” could be in the form of depreciation allowed 
with respect to capital expansions that may be unnecessary, and would in any 
event have been foregone but for the potential presence of monopoly profits 
that make expansions feasible. The process could be this:  nonprofit hospitals 
can charge more for their services than those services would cost if efficiently 
provided, and so they do.  The excess is either absorbed in inefficiency or used 
to pay the debt service on bonds—themselves issued under favorable terms—
used to finance unnecessary expansion of the hospital’s capital plant.91 
So nonprofit hospitals could be awash with potential surpluses that are 
never reflected in their financial reports.  This may be an instance of a failure to 
prove a negative:  the presence of surpluses might prove the presence of 
monopoly profits, but the absence of surpluses cannot prove the absence of 
monopoly profits. 
But even if there are “shadow” monopoly profits in the nonprofit hospital 
subsector, it is unclear what the effects of those monopoly profits may be.  Some 
may be quite benign.  For example, it is likely that some of the shadow surplus 
is consumed by the research budgets of university hospitals.92  If and to the 
degree that this is what is going on, it is hardly problematic.  Basic research is 
rich in positive externalities:  it often leads to profitable applications, but it is 
usually not profitable in itself.  Recognition of this provides one of the 
justifications for tax subsidies of basic research.93 
 
 89. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 23. 
 90. See text and notes at supra note 61. 
 91. Of course, this possibility would be sporadically constrained by certificate-of-need 
requirements imposed by various state authorities.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 61. 
 92. Havighurst and Richman report estimates that $20–25 billion is spent by hospitals on medical 
education and research.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 21 n.36.  
 93. Note that scientific research is one of the purposes that may be pursued by organizations 
exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). One may object at this point that the subsidy for basic 
research is coming from the pockets of the insured employees whose premiums pay for medical services 
set at monopoly prices.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–21.  But those premiums are 
paid with pre-tax dollars, rather than being paid with post-tax dollars, as most consumption is.  It is 
difficult to be certain about the magnitudes involved on either side of this trade-off, but it is not 
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But in that most nonprofit hospitals do not pursue significant research 
agendas, this explanation is at best reassuring only as to a small part of 
whatever shadow surpluses may exist.  It must be admitted that more probable 
candidates to explain the bulk of shadow surpluses are either simply waste—
due to the combination of inefficiency and lack of budget pressures—or bloat—
an accumulation of excessive amounts of capital within the nonprofit hospital 
subsector.  What if the structure of the nonprofit-hospital subsector is rife with 
either or both of these? 
Waste is difficult to defend.  But it may be worth noting that if the health 
care industry is, in effect, rigged, so that monopoly profits are available, and can 
be leveraged by the addition to the mix of third-party payer moral hazards,94 
then the presence of nonprofit participants in the market may simply reduce the 
monopoly profits available to the for-profit participants.  Waste is still waste, 
and it might be preferable to have for-profits enjoy even higher profits if the 
alternative is dead-weight loss due to waste.  But from the point of view of 
consumers in this market, it may not make much difference:  monopoly prices 
will prevail, whether the benefits of that are enjoyed by shareholders of for-
profit providers, or wasted by nonprofit ones. 
Bloat is an equally unattractive characterization, but it too must be analyzed 
within the context of the health care industry overall.  If bloat occurs because 
nonprofits have nowhere else to go with their surpluses, one must ask what 
influence that might have on the for-profit participants in the same market?  
They suffer no comparable barrier to the distribution of accumulated capital 
within the provider entities; they are free to pay dividends if they wish.  In most 
industries, there is an optimal level of capital investment—higher in competitive 
industries, lower in monopolized ones.  If the health-services industry behaves 
according to this principle, then the overinvestment by nonprofits may well be 
offset by lesser capital investments by for-profit firms in the industry, so that the 
overall level of capital investment remains optimal.95  One might expect to see 
nonprofits in this scenario to be more likely to have expensive, but relatively 
infrequently used, items of equipment, while for-profits confine their capital 
expenditures to items that are reasonably sure to experience high demand. 
Of course, a fundamental premise of this symposium is that the health care 
industry is not like other monopolized industries, particularly in the sense that 
exploitation of the monopoly opportunities does not take the usual form of 
reduced output at higher prices.  The third-party-payer situation arguably 
makes possible both the charging of monopoly prices and the expansion of 
output.  If that is the case, then there may be no natural optimum of capital 
 
unreasonable to imagine that the savings from the pre-tax feature offset the lost consumer surplus due 
to monopoly pricing. 
 94. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 20–25. 
 95. Again, certificate-of-need requirements, being based on all facilities in a geographic area, 
whether for-profit or not, would operate as overall constraints.  Thus, overinvestment by nonprofits 
would tend to constrain investment by for-profit firms. 
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invested in the industry.  However, if that is true, one must ask again whether 
the presence of nonprofit providers in the industry makes any difference.  If the 
incentives toward bloat are built into the context—in particular here, the tax-
subsidized third-party payer problem—will they not affect for-profit firms in 
much the way they affect nonprofit firms?  And if so, does the mix of the two 
types matter?  And does it ultimately make any difference that nonprofit firms 
have an additional constraint that virtually obligates them to pursue bloat as a 
more or less conscious strategy? 
These questions certainly deserve exploration, although they may not be 
amenable to conclusive resolution.  But framing them as I have done in this 
concluding section brings me back to some of the points emphasized in the 
preceding ones.  In particular, it would seem that the primary forces that lead to 
the bizarre features of the American health care market are not ones that have 
much to do with the exempt status of some of the providers within that market.  
Rather, they have to do with the dominance of third-party payers financed by 
pre-tax dollars.  Solving the mysteries of this market may involve, as it often 
does in detective fiction, following the money.  And the real money in this 
industry is in the tax-subsidized third-party payers. 
